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Abstract— since data in cloud will be placed anywhere,
because of the critical nature of the applications, it is
important that clouds be secure. The major security
challenge with clouds is that the owner of the data may not
have control of where the data is placed. This is because if
one wants to exploit the benefits of using cloud computing.
This requirement imposes clear data management choices:
original plain data must be accessible only by trusted
parties that do not include cloud providers, intermediaries,
and Internet; in any untrusted context, data must be
encrypted. Satisfying these goals has different levels of
complexity depending on the type of cloud service. We
propose Secure DBaaS as the first solution that allows
cloud tenants to take full advantage of DBaaS qualities,
such as availability, reliability, and elastic scalability,
without exposing unencrypted data to the cloud provider.
The architecture design was motivated by goal: to allow
multiple, independent, and geographically distributed
clients to execute concurrent operations on encrypted data,
including SQL statements that modify the database
structure.The proposed architecture has the further
advantage of eliminating intermediate proxies that limit
the elasticity, availability, and scalability properties that
are intrinsic in cloud-based solutions. The efficacy of the
proposed architecture is evaluated through theoretical
analyses and extensive experimental results based on a
prototype implementation subject to the TPC-C standard
benchmark for different numbers of clients and network
latencies.
Key words: Cloud, security, confidentiality, Secure DBaaS,
database.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Aim of our system is, to integrate cloud database
services with data confidentiality and thepossibility of
executing concurrent operations on encrypted data. We use
cloud for uploading owner's data.Data Owner who has
uploaded his data on cloud he is not ensure about his data,
so we have to store his dataon the cloud by encrypting his
data. This encryption of data takes place at client side and
metadata of thatdata also created i.e. secure DBaaS concept.
This encrypted data is stored at the cloud along with
itsencrypted metadata. Then the authorized clients can
access the data by using only metadata.This is the first
solution supporting geographically distributed clients to
connect directly to anencrypted cloud database, and to
execute concurrent and independent operations including
those modifyingthe database structure. The proposed system
has the further advantage of eliminating intermediate
proxiesthat limit the elasticity, availability, and scalability
properties that are intrinsic in cloud-based
solutions.SecureDBaaS provides several original features
that differentiate it from previous work in the field
ofsecurity for remote database services.The architecture
design was motivated by a threefoldgoal: to allow multiple,
independent, and geographicallydistributed clients to
execute concurrent operations onencrypted data, including
SQL statements that modify thedatabase structure; to
preserve data confidentiality andconsistency at the client
and cloud level; to eliminate anyintermediate server
between the cloud client and the cloudprovider. The
possibility of combining availability, elasticity,and
scalability of a typical cloud DBaaS with dataconfidentiality
is demonstrated through a prototype ofSecureDBaaS that
supports the execution of concurrent and independent
operations to the remote encrypted database from many
geographically distributed clients asin any unencrypted
DBaaS setup. To achieve these goals,SecureDBaaS
integrates existing cryptographic schemes,isolation
mechanisms, and novel strategies for managementof
encrypted metadata on the untrusted cloud database.
Thispaper contains a theoretical discussion about solutions
fordata consistency issues due to concurrent and
independentclient accesses to encrypted data. In this
context, we cannotapply fully homomorphic encryption
schemes [7] because oftheir excessive computational
complexity.The SecureDBaaS architecture is tailored to
cloudplatforms and does not introduce any intermediary
proxyor broker server between the client and the
cloudprovider. Eliminating any trusted intermediate
serverallows SecureDBaaS to achieve the same
availability,reliability, and elasticity levels of a cloud
DBaaS. Otherproposals (e.g., [8], [9], [10], [11]) based on
intermediateserver(s) were considered impracticable for a
cloud-basedsolution because any proxy represents a single
point offailure and a system bottleneck that limits the
mainbenefits (e.g., scalability, availability, and elasticity) of
adatabase service deployed on a cloud platform.
UnlikeSecureDBaaS, architectures relying on a trusted
intermediateproxy do not support the most typical cloud
scenariowhere geographically dispersed clients can
concurrentlyissue read/write operations and data structure
modificationsto a cloud database.A large set of experiments
based on real cloud platformsdemonstrate that SecureDBaaS
is immediately applicable toany DBMS because it requires
no modification to the clouddatabase services. Other studies
where the proposedarchitecture is subject to the TPC-C
standard benchmarkfor different numbers of clients and
network latenciesshow that the performance of concurrent
read and writeoperations not modifying the SecureDBaaS
databasestructure is comparable to that of unencrypted
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clouddatabase. Workloads including modifications to the
databasestructure are also supported by SecureDBaaS, but
atthe price of overheads that seem acceptable to achieve
thedesired level of data confidentiality.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The system mainly focuses on following-
• Cloud database
• Metadata Management
• Encryption algorithm
Cloud database: We assume that tenant data are saved in a
relational database. We have to preserve theconfidentiality
of the stored data and even of the database structure because
table and column names mayyield information about saved
data. We distinguish the strategies for encrypting the
database structures andthe tenant data.
Metadata Management: Metadata generated by
SecureDBaaS contain all the information that is necessaryto
manage SQL statements over the encrypted database in a
way transparent to the user. Metadatamanagement strategies
represent an original idea because SecureDBaaS is the first
architecture storing allmetadata in the untrusted cloud
database together with the encrypted tenant data.
Encryption algorithm: Choosing the encryption algorithms
used to encrypt and decrypt all the data storedin the
database table.
Fig 1: Secure DBaaS architecture.
Fig. 1 describes the overall architecture. We assume that a
tenant organization acquires a clouddatabase service from
an untrusted DBaaS provider. The tenant then deploys one
or more machines (Client 1through N) and installs a
SecureDBaaS client on each of them. This client allows a
user to connect to thecloud DBaaS to administer it, to read
and write data, and even to create and modify the database
tables aftercreation. SecureDBaaS is designed to allow
multiple and independent clients to connect directly to
theuntrusted cloud DBaaS without any intermediate server
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
Cloud database: We assume that tenant data are saved in a
relational database. We have to preserve theconfidentiality
of the stored data and even of the database structure because
table and column names mayyield information about saved
data. We distinguish the strategies for encrypting the
database structures andthe tenant data.
Metadata Management: Metadata generated by
SecureDBaaS contain all the information that isnecessary to
manage SQL statements over the encrypted database in a
way transparent to the user. Metadatamanagement strategies
represent an original idea because Secure DBaaS is the first
architecture storing allmetadata in the untrusted cloud
database together with the encrypted tenant data.
Encryption algorithm: Choosing the encryption algorithms
used to encrypt and decrypt all the datastored in the
database table.
Fig 2 describes the system design having modules and its
components.
1. Creation of database-
In this module client creates its database and store data in
the form or columns and rows. Aftercreation of Database
the client also creates its metadata which will help for later
communication instead ofwhole database.
2. Selection of encryption and decryption algorithm -
In this module we select the encryption algorithm to encrypt
and decrypt the created database and itsmetadata. It will
provide security to whole data of client which is to be
uploaded on the cloud.
3. Cloud Database-
Cloud Database is the service provider, which provides
services to the tenants. All the encrypted datafrom data
owner is uploaded on cloud which provides concurrent
access to cloud DB to the geographicallydeployed clients.
Cloud DB contains encrypted database and its encrypted
metadata.
4. Application-
This module contains the application of system to the cloud.
How we willApply these all on cloud this module explains
it. We use master key to access cloud data after data
isuploaded on data. First we will get encrypted data if our
key is correct then by using random decryption keyswe will
get the final output in the form of plaintext data. Input is
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taken from user in the form of sql query.Firstly client will
create Database then, will enter rows into the database.
After that the metadata of databaseis created. Then selected
encryption algorithm is applied to the database and its
metadata. Final output givesthe encrypted data with all its
information and key used.
IV.IMPLEMENTATION
Data Management:
Cloud database acts as service provider for tenants. The
cloud is created first for the system. Allinformation or data
store in the relational database. So for creating tables and
column we have to access itwith SQL query only.
Metadata Management:
Metadata generated by SecureDBaaS contain all the
information that is necessary to manage SQLstatements over
the encrypted database in a way transparent to the user.
Metadata management strategiesrepresent an original idea
because SecureDBaaS is the first architecture storing all
metadata in the untrustedcloud database together with the
encrypted tenant data.SecureDBaaS uses two types of
metadata.
• Database metadata are related to the whole database. There
is onlyone instance of this metadata type for each database.
• Table metadata are associated with one secure table. Each
table metadatacontains all information that is necessary to
encrypt and decrypt data of the associated secure table.This
design choice makes it possible to identify which metadata
type is required to execute any SQLstatement so that a
SecureDBaaS client needs to fetch only the metadata related
to the secure table/s thatis/are involved in the SQL
statement.This design choice minimizes the amount of
metadata that each Secure DBaaS client has to fetch from
the untrusted cloud database, thus reducing bandwidth
consumption and processing time. Moreover, it allows
multiple clients to access independently metadata related to
different secure tables. Databasemetadata contain the
encryption keys that are used for the secure types. A
different encryption key is associated with all the possible
combinations of data type and encryption type. Hence, the
database metadata represent a key ring and do not contain
any information about tenant data.
Fig.3. Structure of table metadata.
The structure of a table metadata is represented in Fig. 3.
Table metadata contain the name of therelated secure table
and the unencrypted name of the related plaintext table.
Moreover, table metadatainclude column metadata for each
column of the related secure table. Each column metadata
contain thefollowing information.
• Plain name: the name of the corresponding column of the
plaintext table.
• Coded name: the name of the column of the secure table.
This is the only information that links acolumn to the
corresponding plaintext column because column names of
secure tables are randomlygenerated.
• Secure type: the secure type of the column. This allows a
SecureDBaaS client to be informed aboutthe data type and
the encryption policies associated with a column.
• Encryption key: the key used to encrypt and decrypt all the
data stored in the column.SecureDBaaS stores metadata in
the metadata storage table that is located in the untrusted
cloud asthe database. This is an original choice that augmnts
flexibility, but opens two novel issues in terms ofefficient
data retrieval and data confidentiality. To allow
SecureDBaaS clients to manipulate metadatathrough SQL
statements, we save database and table metadata in a tabular
form. Even metadataconfidentiality is guaranteed through
encryption. The structure of the metadata storage table is
shown in Fig.4 this table uses one row for the database
metadata, and one row for each table metadata.Database and
table metadata are encrypted through the same encryption
key before being saved. Thisencryption key is called a
master key. Only trusted clients that already know the
master key can decrypt themetadata and acquire information
that is necessary to encrypt and decrypt tenant data. Each
metadata can beretrieved by clients through an associated
ID, which is the primary key of the metadata storage table.
ThisID is computed by applying a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) function to the name of the object(database or
table) described by the corresponding row. The use of a
deterministic MAC function allowsclients to retrieve the
metadata of a given table by knowing its plaintext name.
This mechanism has thefurther benefit of allowing clients to
access each metadata independently, which is an important
feature inconcurrent environments. In addition,
SecureDBaaS clients can use caching policies to reduce the
bandwidthoverhead.
Fig.4. Organization of database metadata and table metadata
in the metadata storage table.
Algorithms:
Encryption algorithms are applied to encrypt the database.
There are various encryption algorithmssymmetric and
asymmetric, but we will apply symmetric algorithm which
proved key distribution only onceto all tenants there will be
no different private key related to every user.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed concurrent and independent
access to encrypted cloud databases,proposes an innovative
architecture that guarantees confidentiality of data stored in
public cloud databases.The proposed system will not require
modifications to the cloud database, and it will be
immediatelyapplicable to existing cloudDBaaS. Resolve
problem of single point failure and a bottleneck
limitingavailability and scalability of cloud database
services.A large partof the research includes solutions to
support concurrentSQL operations (including statements
modifying thedatabase structure) on encrypted data issued
by heterogenousand possibly geographically dispersed
clients. Theproposed architecture does not require
modifications tothe cloud database, and it is immediately
applicableto existing cloud DBaaS, such as the
experimentedPostgreSQL Plus Cloud Database [23],
Windows Azure [24], and Xeround [22]. There are no
theoretical andpractical limits to extend our solution to other
platformsand to include new encryption algorithms.It is
worth observing that experimental results based onthe TPC-
C standard benchmark show that the performanceimpact of
data encryption on response time becomesnegligible
because it is masked by network latencies thatare typical of
cloud scenarios. In particular, concurrentread and write
operations that do not modify the structureof the encrypted
database cause negligible overhead.Dynamic scenarios
characterized by (possibly) concurrentmodifications of the
database structure are supported, butat the price of high
computational costs. These performanceresults open the
space to future improvements thatwe are investigating.
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